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STREAMLINING THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR FCPA-ICSID
INTERACTION
MICHAEL A. LOSCO†
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, the number of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) enforcement actions has soared, as has the number of cases
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). At the same time, events have demonstrated that two
problems may arise from the lack of coordination between
anticorruption investigations and ICSID arbitration proceedings.
First, anticorruption investigations may reveal arbitral decisions to be
incorrect due to a lack of evidence regarding corruption in the
formation of investment contracts. Second, the “corruption
defense”—an emerging affirmative defense that allows host states to
invoke corruption in the formation of investment contracts as an
absolute bar to liability—creates a perverse incentive that encourages
states to expropriate investors’ assets, or to renegotiate for
burdensome new terms, following FCPA investigations.
This Note explores the characteristics of the corruption defense as
applied by ICSID tribunals, including the evidentiary burden placed
upon the host state to assert the defense. It then proposes a
framework for FCPA-ICSID interaction designed to strengthen the
defense and to further the goal of eradicating global corruption. It
proposes using tools such as waiver and disgorgement, contract cure,
and communication between FCPA enforcement authorities and
ICSID tribunals to remedy the problems identified above.

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Siemens AG (Siemens) won a $1 billion concession for
services related to the production of an Argentine national
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identification card. The contract between Siemens and the Argentine
government was governed by a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)
2
between Germany and Argentina. Not three years later, a number of
factors—including skyrocketing sovereign debt and the pegging of the
Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar—converged to cause the Argentine
3
economy to contract rapidly. In an effort to keep the economy afloat,
the legislature passed the “Economic-Financial Emergency Law”
allowing the president to renegotiate or terminate any government
4
contracts. The government halted parts of the identification card
project and imposed new, nonnegotiable contract terms amidst rapid
5
turnover of government officials. Siemens brought an arbitration
claim against Argentina before the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), alleging that the
6
country’s actions constituted an expropriation of its investment. The
ICSID tribunal found that Argentina’s actions over the course of the
crisis constituted a “creeping” expropriation and a violation of the
state’s duties of full protection and fair and equitable treatment of
7
foreign investment. It ordered Argentina to compensate Siemens in
8
the amount of $217 million. The issue of corruption never arose
during the proceedings, as there was no evidence to suggest that any
such activity had taken place.
Shortly after the tribunal issued its award, however, “German
prosecutors discovered Siemens had engaged in rather astonishing
9
acts of systematic bribery around the world.” Siemens had procured
1. R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Note, Undermining ICSID: How the Global Antibribery
Regime Impairs Investor-State Arbitration, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 995, 1027 (2012).
2. Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 78 (Feb. 6,
2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009). For a discussion of bilateral investment treaties, see infra Part
I.A.
3. Peter Katel, Argentina’s Crisis Explained, TIME (Dec. 20, 2001), http://content.time.com
/time/world/article/0,8599,189393,00.html.
4. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 96.
5. Id. ¶¶ 91–97. In a take-it-or-leave-it deal, Argentina proposed halving both the
duration of the contract and the number of identification cards to be issued and eliminating its
obligation to stop issuing the old type of identification card. Id. ¶¶ 97, 112. Siemens did not
accept the terms of the new proposal and Argentina ultimately terminated the contract pursuant
to a decree issued under the Economic-Financial Emergency Law. Id. ¶ 97.
6. Id. ¶ 213. For a list of measures that Siemens alleged constituted expropriation of its
investment, see id. ¶ 218.
7. Id. ¶¶ 262–65, 273, 308–09.
8. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1027.
9. Id.
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the Argentine contract after paying $105 million in bribes to
10
Argentine officials over the course of a decade. Siemens pleaded
guilty to violating the accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
11
Practices Act (FCPA), and it subsequently waived the $217 million
12
award. Its precise reasons for doing so remain unclear. As a result of
its guilty plea, Siemens became the subject of the largest criminal
penalty ($450 million) and the largest disgorgement of profits ($350
13
million) in FCPA history. Even today, its total settlement of $800
million is double the amount of the third largest settlement in FCPA
14
history.
These events demonstrate that investment contracts procured
through bribery or fraud may become the subject of an FCPA
investigation as well as an ICSID dispute. Prosecutions under the
FCPA have exploded in the past decade, as have investor-state suits
15
before ICSID tribunals. Unfortunately, the regimes do not have a
mechanism for communicating with one another. Siemens’s waiver of
the $217 million ICSID award in its favor highlights just one problem
that can emerge from a lack of communication between FCPA
enforcement authorities and ICSID tribunals.
This Note seeks to address two problems arising from the lack of
coordination between FCPA enforcement authorities and ICSID
16
tribunals. First, as shown by Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic,
anticorruption investigations may reveal arbitral decisions to be

10. Id.
11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012).
12. Luke Eric Peterson, Siemens Waives Rights Under Arbitral Award Against Argentina;
Company’s Belated Corruption Confessions Had Led Argentina To Seek Revision of 2007
Ruling, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Sept. 2, 2009, § 10; Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud
Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Angela T. Burgess, Davis
Polk & Wardwell (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
siemens.pdf; Richard L. Cassin, Final Settlements for Siemens, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 15, 2008, 7:22
PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/12/16/final-settlements-for-siemens.html.
13. Cassin, supra note 12; Richard L. Cassin, Total Lands Third on the Top 10
Disgorgement List, FCPA BLOG (May 31, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2013/5/31/total-lands-third-on-the-top-10-disgorgement-list.html.
14. Richard L. Cassin, With Magyar in New Top Ten, It’s 90% Non-U.S., FCPA BLOG
(Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyar-in-new-topten-its-90-non-us.html. In 2010, the U.K. company BAE Systems agreed to the third largest
settlement, which included a $400 million criminal fine. Id.
15. See infra notes 54–55, 58–61 and accompanying text.
16. Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Feb. 6, 2007),
14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009).
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incorrect due to a lack of evidence regarding corruption in the
formation of investment contracts. Second, the corruption defense
creates a perverse incentive that encourages states to expropriate
investors’ assets—or to renegotiate for burdensome new terms—
17
following FCPA investigations. The implications of these problems
are not merely jurisprudential, but can be measured in billions of
dollars.
The relationship between the international investment regime
and anticorruption efforts around the globe has been the subject of
18
some recent scholarship, but little attention has been devoted to the
lack of coordination between the two. In particular, little scholarly
attention has been devoted to analyzing the contours of an emerging
affirmative defense that allows host states to invoke corruption in the
19
formation of investment contracts as an absolute bar to liability.
Moreover, commentators analyzing the corruption defense have
generally forgone a topical approach to the defense in favor of a case20
by-case assessment. This Note examines the components of the
corruption defense as applied by tribunals. It then addresses the
problem of inaccurate arbitral awards due to insufficient evidence of
corruption, and it proposes a novel solution to the problem of
perverse incentives for host states.
Part I of this Note traces the development and functions of the
overlapping ICSID and FCPA regimes. Part II explores the elements
of the emerging corruption defense as applied by ICSID tribunals,
including the evidentiary burden placed upon the host state for
asserting the defense. Because a strong corruption defense is essential
to the worthy goal of eradicating global corruption, Part III of this
Note proposes a framework for FCPA-ICSID interaction designed to
strengthen the defense and further that goal. With the aim of
promoting justice and transparency, Part III proposes using tools such

17. See infra Part III.
18. E.g., Rashna Bhojwani, Note, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private
Enforcement Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66 (2012); Torres-Fowler, supra note 1.
19. For further discussion of the defense, see infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 108–11 (advocating that FCPA enforcers should
consider the totality of the case, including arbitration awards); Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at
1034–37 (proposing taking into account factors on a case-by-case basis instead of “extensive
reforms”). But see Jason Webb Yackee, Essay, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption: An
Emerging Defense for Host States?, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 723, 736–42 (2012) (examining the
principle of good faith and “in accordance” provisions).
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as waiver and disgorgement, contract cure, and communication
between FCPA enforcement authorities and ICSID tribunals to
remedy the problems identified herein.
I. OVERLAPPING LEGAL REGIMES
The system of international investment arbitration is designed to
resolve disputes between investors and host states, whereas domestic
anticorruption laws such as the FCPA are designed to punish
investors for their illicit conduct. When corruption occurs in the
context of foreign direct investment, these two legal regimes
frequently overlap. This Part provides an overview of each regime.
A. ICSID Arbitration
Investment arbitration allows private corporations investing in a
country to sue that host state directly before an international tribunal,
21
thus bypassing that country’s domestic legal system. ICSID,
established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
22
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID
Convention) in 1965 as an arm of the World Bank, is a leading
arbitral body that provides a framework for resolving investment
23
disputes. ICSID’s principal goal is to “promot[e] international
capital investment by allaying the common apprehension that
investors seeking opportunities in the developing world lack[]
24
effective legal protections against a foreign state.” ICSID has largely
succeeded in allaying such concerns by providing a neutral forum for
25
resolving investor-state disputes. ICSID does not directly arbitrate
disputes, but rather “provides the institutional and procedural
framework” for independent tribunals constituted under its rules to

21. See Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS. 1 (Jan. 20, 2013),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Show
Document&icsidOverview=true&language=English (“Investor-State [arbitration] is a form of
resolution of disputes between foreign investors and the State that hosts their investment [and
that] allows foreign investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a host State.”).
22. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
23. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 996.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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26

do so. Tribunals are typically composed of three arbitrators: one
selected by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the
27
parties or by the two other arbitrators. Their decisions are not
28
binding on future tribunals, but the rationales they employ may be
29
30
persuasive. Notably, ICSID awards are not subject to appeal.
Though commercial arbitration proceedings are typically kept
31
strictly confidential, ICSID has moved away from a model of strict
confidentiality so as to develop a body of case law that may be
32
persuasive to future tribunals. Pursuant to Article 48 of the ICSID
26. ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT
DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Rig
htFrame&FromPage=Dispute%20Settlement%20Facilities&pageName=Disp_settl_facilities
(last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
27. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 22, art. 37(2)(b), 17 U.S.T. at 1285, 575 U.N.T.S. at 184.
28. Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis
of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129, 131 (2007) (“[T]here exists no obligation
of stare decisis in the context of investment treaty arbitration . . . .”).
29. See id. at 129 (“[T]he awards and decisions reported in ICSID Reports, and elsewhere,
are not binding on any future tribunals, but remain persuasive nonetheless.”). See generally TaiHeng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1014, 1021–44 (2006) (describing, in form and practice, the concept of precedent in investment
arbitration).
30. See Tai-Heng Cheng, The Role of Justice in Annulling Investor-State Arbitration
Awards, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 236, 251 (2013) (“Unlike a domestic court decision, which is
subject to appeal by a higher court, an ICSID award is not open to appeal. It is only subject to
rectification, interpretation, revision or annulment, which are all different in nature
from appeals.”); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, supra note 22, arts. 50–52, 17 U.S.T. at 1289–90, 575 U.N.T.S. at
190–91 (providing limited redress for disputes relating to the meaning or scope of award, newly
discovered material facts, or procedural errors); id. art. 53(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at
194 (noting that awards are binding on parties).
31. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 427, 447 (2010) (“[T]he precise number of cases and the specific nature of their decisions
are difficult to determine because of the number of potential arbitral forums open to investorstate disputes and the varying degrees of confidentiality with which the forums cloak their
operations.”); id. at 462 (“[T]he confidentiality which in varying degrees applies to investorstate dispute settlement . . . appears to be derived from the processes and culture of
international commercial arbitration.”).
32. Andrew de Lotbinière Mcdougall & Ank Santens, ICSID Amends Its Arbitration Rules,
WHITE & CASE 2 (Oct. 2006), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/e6da84a5-e1a8-462a89e3-147a369efdb8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/232b4eb2-3248-48f9-aca5-16652b545fd
8/article_Icsid_Amends_its_Arbitration_Rules.pdf; see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE
SHORE & MATHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES ¶ 1.34 (2007) (“In contrast to commercial arbitration, where the reporting of
awards is often restricted or fragmentary, the practice in investment arbitration . . . has come to
be that the majority of awards are made public.”).
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Convention, both parties to an arbitration proceeding must consent
33
for an award to be published. Nevertheless, following amendments
to the ICSID Convention and Rules in 2006, tribunals must now
publish the legal reasoning behind their awards, subject to the Article
34
48 requirement of consent for publication of the full award. This
eschewal of strict confidentiality has allowed for the development of a
body of case law regarding the effect of corruption on the validity of
investment contracts.
To invoke ICSID jurisdiction, a claimant must satisfy three
35
prerequisites set forth in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. First,
the dispute must be between a state party to the ICSID Convention
and a national (usually a corporation or other business entity) of
36
another ICSID contracting state. Second, the dispute must arise
37
directly out of an investment. Third, the parties must have consented
38
in writing to ICSID arbitration.
Consent to ICSID arbitration is typically established in a BIT or
in a multilateral treaty such as the North American Free Trade
39
Agreement (NAFTA) or the Energy Charter Treaty. The majority
40
of ICSID claims are commenced pursuant to BITs, which govern the

33. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 22, art. 48(5), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188.
34. Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules reads: “The Centre shall not publish the
award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.” INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INV. DISPUTES, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID
CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, at 122, Rule 48(4), ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006). Before
2006, Rule 48 provided only that “[t]he Centre may . . . include in its publications excerpts of the
legal rules applied by the Tribunal.” Lotbinière & Santens, supra note 32, at 2 (emphasis
omitted). In 2010, ICSID embarked on a project to obtain consent for publication from all
parties to concluded cases to expand the public accessibility of ICSID jurisprudence. Publication
of ICSID Decisions and Awards with the Parties’ Consent, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT
INVESTMENT DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH
&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pag
eName=Announcement54 (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
35. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 22, at art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 25–26
(2007).
40. Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), supra note 21, at 2.

LOSCO IN PP CLEAN (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1208

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/26/2014 7:24 PM

[Vol. 63:1201

investment relationships between a state party and investors from the
41
other state party. As bilateral agreements, these can be individually
tailored to particular circumstances; therefore, their provisions may
42
vary in wording and scope. Nevertheless, almost all BITs contain the
43
same types of provisions. In general, BITs confer rights and
privileges upon the investor while imposing obligations on the host
44
state—that is, the country receiving the investment. Such obligations
normally include a responsibility to refrain from unlawful
45
expropriation of the investment, as well as guarantees of fair and
46
47
equitable treatment; full protection and security; prompt, adequate,
48
49
and effective compensation; national treatment; and most-favored50
nation treatment. Furthermore, most BITs define the term
“investment” and extend protection only to claims that satisfy that
51
definition. Finally, nearly all BITs grant investors the right to have
investment disputes resolved in binding international arbitration

41. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 41–49 (2009) (tracing the origin and development of
BITs and noting that “[u]ntil 1968, BITs only provided for state-to-state dispute
resolution . . . [and] that [apparently] the first BIT that expressly incorporates provisions for
investor-state arbitration . . . is Indonesia-Netherlands (1968)”).
42. See ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 18 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2012) (noting “considerable differences in
wording and scope of protection” among BITs).
43. See id. (“[T]he major issues addressed in different BITs are strikingly similar: almost
all contain a definition of investors and investment, a number of investor rights – admission, fair
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, prompt adequate and effective
compensation, national treatment, most favored nation treatment – and the general consent to
binding investment arbitration, i.e. ICSID or otherwise.”).
44. See KULICK, supra note 42, at 1 (“BITs mainly, and in a plethora of cases exclusively,
deal with investor rights.”); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 41, at 64 (“[International
Investment Agreements] impose obligations on host states with respect to investments and
investors; there are no corresponding international obligations imposed on foreign
investors . . . or on the investors’ home state . . . .”); VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 40–41
(“[T]he capital-importing state assumes major liabilities to multinational firms without securing
any legal advantage under the treaty for its own nationals. . . . [T]he effect is to regulate capitalimporting states intensively without imposing binding obligations on home states or investors.”).
45. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 41, at 334–35.
46. Id. at 233–35.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 18.
49. Id. at 146–50.
50. Id. at 192, 200–01.
51. See KULICK, supra note 42, at 18 (noting that a BIT’s scope of protection is tied to its
definition of “investment”).

LOSCO IN PP CLEAN (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/26/2014 7:24 PM

STREAMLINING THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE

1209

without having to first exhaust the remedies available in the domestic
52
legal system of the host state. By providing general consent to
dispute resolution under ICSID rules, BITs thus satisfy the consent
53
requirement for ICSID jurisdiction.
The number of BITs in force has exploded over the past
54
55
decade, with more than 2,500 such treaties now concluded. As the
number of BITs has increased, so has the number of claims brought in
ICSID arbitration. “From 1996 to 2005 ICSID registered 166 claims,
56
compared to 35 claims in the previous three decades . . . .” This
number continues to grow rapidly, with thirty-nine new claims
57
brought in 2012 alone, a 20 percent increase from the previous year.
B. The FCPA and Anticorruption Enforcement
The past decade has also seen a significant increase in the
enforcement of anticorruption statutes such as the FCPA. When it
58
was enacted in 1977, the FCPA was the world’s first anticorruption
59
statute. Though enforcement was limited for the first two decades of

52. See Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin
America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 313 (2004)
(“Historically, an alien investor was required to exhaust local remedies before its state could
espouse a claim before an international tribunal. . . . Under BITs, these rules have either been
eliminated or modified.”).
53. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 22, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175; see VAN HARTEN,
supra note 39, at 100 (describing general consent in investment treaties as “a blank cheque” for
future arbitration).
54. VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 3.
55. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 41, at 57.
56. VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 30.
57. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 24–25
(2012),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSID
PublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnualReports&year=2012_Eng.
58. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2012)).
59. See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007) (“The FCPA was passed by the U.S.
Congress in December 1977 . . . . [It] was the first [legislation] in the world to recognize and seek
to curb the contribution of foreign firms.”); Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations
Law To Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J.
445, 451–52 (2012) (“Instances of overseas commercial bribery surfaced in the wake of the
Watergate scandal, spurring Congress to enact the world’s first anticorruption statute, the
FCPA, in 1977.”).
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60

the statute’s life, enforcement has since increased dramatically—
particularly in the last ten years. From 2004 to 2009 alone, the number
of new enforcement actions increased from as few as five to over
61
forty. Criminal penalties in excess of $20 million are now
commonplace, and the largest settlements have exceeded $100
62
million. Siemens’s 2008 settlement totaling $800 million is currently
63
the largest on record.
64
The FCPA is composed of two parts: the antibribery provisions
65
and the accounting provisions. The antibribery portion of the statute
prohibits corporations, including their agents and employees, from
66
making payments or giving gifts to foreign officials. Specifically, it
criminalizes “the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to” a foreign
67
official. In so doing, the FCPA takes a supply-side approach to
punishing and preventing corruption—that is, it seeks to reduce the
supply of bribes to foreign officials by punishing bribe-paying
corporations—rather than attempting to reduce the demand for
68
bribes by punishing bribe-taking officials. It applies not only to
69
domestic businesses, but also to foreign and domestic issuers of
securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges who commit violations
70
outside the United States and to foreign companies who commit acts
in furtherance of a violation “while in the territory of the United

60. See Krever, supra note 59, at 93 (“In its first two decades, enforcement of the Act by
the DOJ and SEC was, at best, sporadic, and limited to high profile investigations.”).
61. Ross, supra note 59, at 460; Richard L. Cassin, 2009 FCPA Enforcement Index, FCPA
BLOG (Dec. 31, 2009, 3:15 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/12/31/2009-fcpaenforcement-index.html.
62. Ross, supra note 59, at 460; Cassin, supra note 14.
63. Cassin, supra note 14. Interestingly, nine of the ten biggest penalties were levied against
non-U.S. companies. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
65. Id. § 78m(b).
66. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
67. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a).
68. See David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution,
and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 476–77 (2009) (noting that the FCPA’s focus on
supply-side actors of foreign bribery constituted the first effort in the world to criminalize large,
multinational corporations for paying foreign officials).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
70. Id. § 78dd-1; Ross, supra note 59, at 454.
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71

States.” The extraterritorial reach of the statute gives enforcing
authorities broad discretion, and uncertainty about the meaning of
the statutory phrase “in the territory of the United States” may add to
72
that discretion.
Among signatories to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
73
(OECD Convention), the United States leads the way in
74
prosecutions for foreign bribery. But the FCPA is not the world’s
most stringent antibribery statute. The United Kingdom, for example,
enacted a new antibribery regime in 2010, which entered into force in
75
July 2011. That statute is “substantially broader and stricter than the
76
FCPA.” Whereas the FCPA criminalizes only the payment of bribes
77
to foreign officials, the Bribery Act 2010 (U.K. Bribery Act)
78
criminalizes the payment of bribes to foreign public officials, as well
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
72. See Ross, supra note 59, at 464–65 (“Within the confines of the statute, it is not clear
what it means to be ‘in the territory of the United States’ . . . .”). The FCPA’s reach may even
extend to such attenuated contacts as the transfer of money unintentionally through a U.S. bank
account. Id. However, especially in the wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2877–78 (2010), there is a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws (including the FCPA), particularly when the intended effects of the illegal activity are felt
outside the United States. Id. at 2877–83; Ross, supra note 59, at 472–73.
73. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
74. See FRITZ HEIMANN AND GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING
CORRUPTION? COUNTRY ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
PROGRESS REPORT 2012, at 6 (2012), available at http://files.transparency.org/
content/download/510/2109/file/2012_ExportingCorruption_OECDProgress_EN.pdf (“Another
positive development is the substantial increase in the number of cases brought in the countries
in the Active Enforcement category. The US leads with 275 cases, an increase of 48 since last
year . . . .”). A 2012 report by Transparency International covering thirty-seven of the thirtynine signatories to the OECD Convention classified seven countries as “active” enforcers of the
Convention’s provisions and twelve countries as “moderate” enforcers. Id.
75. Id. at 36–37.
76. Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD AntiBribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2012); see Sharifa G. Hunter, A Comparative
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, and the Practical
Implications of Both on International Business, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 109 (2011)
(comparing and contrasting the antibribery provisions of the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act).
According to Professor Hunter, the actual impact of the U.K. Bribery Act will depend on the
“prosecutory appetite” of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012); Hunter, supra note 76, at 96–97.
78. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6 (U.K.); Spahn, supra note 76, at 17 n.73.
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79

as to private individuals. Unlike the FCPA, it also criminalizes the
80
receipt of bribes. The FCPA provides an exception for facilitation
payments intended “to expedite or to secure the performance of a
81
routine governmental action,” whereas the U.K. Bribery Act
82
provides no such exception. It does, however, provide an affirmative
defense through which a corporation may avoid liability for failure to
prevent bribery by demonstrating that it had “adequate procedures”
83
in place to prevent bribery. The FCPA provides no such compliance
84
defense.
The burden of FCPA enforcement is jointly carried by the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange
85
Commission (SEC). The DOJ investigates and prosecutes criminal
86
charges, and the SEC brings civil suits against violators. Historically,
the SEC focused primarily on violations of the accounting provisions,
but it is now becoming more active in enforcing the bribery
87
provisions. Today, the two agencies “work together to bring parallel
88
criminal and civil [actions] against [violators].” The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) has also recently begun to play a significant
89
role in investigating FCPA violations.

79. Bribery Act § 1; Hunter, supra note 76, at 97–98; Spahn, supra note 76, at 17 n.73.
80. Bribery Act § 2; Hunter, supra note 76, at 95–96; Spahn, supra note 76, at 17 n.73.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b); see Hunter, supra note 76, at 99 (“Routine governmental action
refers to general bureaucratic tasks that foreign officials ordinarily perform. Notably,
the FCPA’s definition of a facilitation payment expressly excludes any foreign official’s decision
to award new business to, or continued business with, any particular party.” (footnote omitted)).
82. Hunter, supra note 76, at 100; Henry W. Asbill et al., DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Jones Day Summary and Analysis, JONES DAY (Dec. 2012),
http://www.jonesday.com/DOJ_SEC_Resource_Guide_to_FCPA/?RSS=true.
83. Bribery Act § 7(2). See generally Peter Alldridge, The U.K. Bribery Act: “The
Caffeinated Younger Sibling of the FCPA,” 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1181, 1202–10 (2012) (analyzing the
adequate-procedures defense).
84. Hunter, supra note 76, at 106; Asbill et al., supra note 82.
85. Weiss, supra note 68, at 478.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 779–80
(2011); Ross, supra note 59, at 461. A 2011 FBI sting operation led to the arrest of twenty-two
individuals for FCPA violations. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives
and Employees of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign
Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/pressreleases/2010/wfo011910.htm. The FBI was reportedly engaged in at least six undercover FCPA
investigations in 2011. McSorley, supra, at 779–80.
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Penalties for FCPA violations may include criminal fines as well
90
as disgorgement of profits. Disgorgement, an equitable remedy
91
designed to prevent unjust enrichment, is relatively new to the
FCPA context. The SEC imported the penalty into the context of
FCPA enforcement only after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
92
of 2002. In applying the remedy as a punishment for FCPA violators,
93
the SEC distinguishes between legally and illegally obtained profits.
Once a causal link is established between an illicit act and profits
stemming from that act, the SEC can require the violator to forfeit,
with interest, the approximate amount earned from the unlawful
94
activity unless the company can show a break in the causal chain.
Given the potential harshness of such a penalty, the FCPA
authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to issue informal advisory
opinions to corporations that inquire about the implications of
95
potential violations. An approving advisory opinion creates a
rebuttable presumption that a corporation’s actions do not violate the
96
FCPA. Advisory opinions can be disseminated to the public, but
97
they are not binding and do not create precedent. In November
2012, the DOJ and SEC jointly released a 120-page guide outlining
98
the agencies’ “approach and priorities” to enforcing the FCPA.
The DOJ’s enforcement of the FCPA relies primarily on out-ofcourt settlement agreements called non-prosecution agreements
99
(NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs).
As
enforcement has expanded, so has the DOJ’s use of these
90. Weiss, supra note 68, at 478.
91. Marc Alain Bohn, What Exactly Is Disgorgement?, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 7:10
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/17/what-exactly-is-disgorgement.html.
92. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Weiss, supra note 68, at 474.
93. Bohn, supra note 91. Illegally obtained profits are those obtained through a violation of
the FCPA.
94. Id.
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), -2(f) (2012); Allen R. Brooks, Note, A Corporate Catch-22:
How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 147 (2010).
96. Brooks, supra note 95, at 147.
97. Id.
98. Lanny A. Breuer & Robert S. Khuzami, Foreword to CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
99. Brooks, supra note 95, at 156.
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100

agreements, which are intended to resolve criminal cases without a
101
102
trial. Though they may benefit corporations in the short term, outof-court settlements do not create precedent and therefore offer little
103
guidance for corporations. As a result, some commentators have
criticized prosecution agreements for hindering the development of a
104
body of law relating to FCPA prosecution.
NPAs are similar to DPAs in most respects. The two types of
agreements typically contain a number of standard requirements,
105
106
107
such as cooperation, admission of conduct, monetary penalties,
108
109
business reforms,
independent monitors,
and miscellaneous

100. Id. at 138. From 1993 to 2002, the DOJ entered into sixteen prosecution agreements. Id.
at 149. Since 2002, that number has increased dramatically, peaking in 2007 and again in 2010
with thirty-nine agreements filed in each of those years. Joseph Warin, 2013 Mid-Year Update
on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 24, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/07/24/2013-mid-year-update-on-corporate-deferred-prosecution-and-nonprosecution-agreements. Thirty-seven agreements were filed in 2012. Id.
101. Brooks, supra note 95, at 139.
102. Id. at 157–58.
103. Id. at 155–56. The DOJ initially set forth guidelines regarding its approach to DPAs in
1997 in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. Id. at 148. The DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs in FCPA
enforcement has since been guided by a series of four memoranda promulgated between 1999
and 2008 by then–Deputy Attorneys General Eric Holder, Larry Thompson, Paul McNulty, and
Mark Filip. See id. at 147–53 (explaining the history and modern use of NPAs and DPAs).
104. See, e.g., id. at 155–56 (“The DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs directly affects the
development of case law under the FCPA because relevant precedent cannot develop from
settling disputes outside the courtroom. . . . This enforcement policy increases market costs and
inefficiencies.”).
105. Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1439–40 (2007). “Before the Filip Memo, prosecutors
often pressured the defendant corporation to turn over documents and data, make witnesses
available, and waive its attorney-client privilege in order to obtain a DPA or an NPA.” Brooks,
supra note 95, at 153–54. The agreements may also include waivers of any relevant statutes of
limitations, meaning that the charges may remain open for a long period of time. Id. at 154.
106. Paulsen, supra note 105, at 1440–41. Detailed admissions to criminal charges usually
result in the award of heavy penalties in civil suits. Id. at 1441. “The fact that corporations
typically agree to these admissions—despite the consequences in civil suits—underscores the
degree to which corporations desire to avoid criminal indictment and/or conviction.” Id.
107. Id. at 1441–42. These often include criminal penalties, civil penalties—such as
disgorgement—and civil settlements to third parties. Id. at 1441.
108. Id. at 1442. These may include personnel changes and hiring of new management and
board members. Id. They may also include changes and improvements to compliance programs,
such as “amended financial controls, hotlines for whistleblowers, training programs to
underscore legal behavior, new personnel hiring policies, and ethics officers.” Id.
109. Id. at 1443.
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110

penalties. There is one important difference, however. In the NPA
context, prosecutors forgo the filing of charging instruments, subject
to the corporation’s fulfillment of the terms of the agreement,
whereas, in the DPA context, prosecutors file an indictment and
agree to dismiss the charges after the terms of the DPA are
111
satisfied. This difference is significant partly because in some cases
112
an indictment alone can trigger penalties for corporations. It also
means that an NPA may send a less harsh message than does a DPA,
though the conditions attached to them can be equally severe.
Regardless, prosecution agreements appear to be firmly entrenched
as a primary mechanism for FCPA enforcement. As such, any
proposal for change in the application of the FCPA must incorporate
them.
II. THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE
Had the Argentine government been aware of Siemens’s corrupt
conduct, it might have invoked that conduct as an absolute bar to its
own liability. The corruption defense allows host states to invoke
corruption in the formation of a contract as a reason to consider the
contract void, thereby precluding any claims by the investor that may
113
arise from the contract. It is an affirmative defense resembling the
common-law defense of unclean hands, which bars a claimant from
recovery if he is guilty of some injustice concerning the very matter
114
for which he seeks relief. The issue at the heart of the defense is
whether a tribunal should enforce an investment contract that has
been tainted by corruption.
The roots of the corruption defense lie in a 1963 award issued by
Judge Gunnar Lagergren in an International Chamber of Commerce
115
116
(ICC) arbitration. Judge Lagergren’s award in ICC Case No. 1110

110. Id.
111. Id. at 1438.
112. Weiss, supra note 68, at 512.
113. See Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 999 (“[T]he ‘corruption defense’ . . . allows tribunals
to void an underlying contract if procured through an act of corruption or bribery.”).
114. Yackee, supra note 20, at 729.
115. Id. at 727–29; see Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1010 (“ICC Case No. 1110 (1963)
marks the first reported international arbitral award specifically addressing claims
of corruption.”).
116. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). The original text of
Judge Lagergren’s award is reprinted in J. Gillis Wetter, Issues of Corruption Before
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was the first reported international arbitral award to directly address
117
the issue of corruption. There, a “politically connected Argentine
118
engineer” sued the respondent, a British company, for breach of a
contract to sell electrical equipment for power plants to the Peronista
119
government of Argentina. Eight years after the initial agreement,
120
the claimant had been unable “to make any sales whatsoever,” and
121
so the respondent retained another agent for a fee of £1 million.
The next year, the claimant surprisingly sold approximately £27
million worth of equipment to the new Argentine government, but
the respondent corporation was unwilling to pay his commission,
122
instead paying his replacement nearly £1 million.
The parties to the arbitration freely admitted that the contract
was meant to take advantage of the claimant’s influence, yet they
123
agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration nonetheless. In fact,
the respondent company conceded that its only reason for retaining
the claimant was “the quite remarkable degree of influence which he
124
had with the political appointees of the Peronista Government.” It
became evident, however, that the contract actually envisioned the

International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar
Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110, 10 ARB. INT’L 277 (1994).
117. See Wetter, supra note 116.
118. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1010.
119. Wetter, supra note 116, at 285. The names of both parties were redacted from the
award. See id. at 282 (replacing the claimant’s and the respondent’s names with “X” and “Y,”
respectively). For several years following the 1950 agreement the claimant failed to make any
sales. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1011. In 1955, just months before the coup that ousted the
Peronista government, the claimant fled Argentina for Germany, where he remained until July
1958, several months after a new round of elections. Wetter, supra note 116, at 285; see Morris
A. Horowitz, The Legacy of Juan Peron, CHALLENGE, Oct. 1963, at 27, 27, 29. He claimed to
have left for Germany because of “serious medical reasons, remaining immobilized there until
July 1958.” Wetter, supra note 116, at 285.
120. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1011.
121. Wetter, supra note 116, at 289.
122. Id. at 285, 289.
123. See Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1010 (“[N]either party actually argued the agency
contract was necessarily illicit or corrupt.”). Here, the contract giving rise to the dispute had a
corrupt activity as its direct object: the bribing of public officials. Id. This type of contract is
commonly known as an “intermediary agreement.” The claimant was an intermediary being
paid to bribe officials to obtain a public contract for the respondent corporation. Many
investment disputes deal with another type of corruption, which occurs not as the object of the
contract but in its procurement. See infra Part II.A.3.
124. Wetter, supra note 116, at 288.
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125

payment of bribes to government officials. The parties asked Judge
Lagergren to disregard the corrupt object of the contract and to
render an award nonetheless.
126
Judge Lagergren refused to do so.
Despite the parties’
agreement to disregard corruption, as well as evidence that
corruption was unavoidable in Argentina, he raised the issue of
jurisdiction sua sponte. He declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
dispute, reasoning that international public policy and bonos mores
127
rendered the contract “invalid or at least unenforceable.” Bribery,
he declared,
is an international evil; it is contrary to good morals and to an
international public policy common to the community of nations. . . .
Parties who ally themselves in an enterprise of the present nature
must realise that they have forfeited any right to ask for assistance of
128
the machinery of justice . . . in settling their disputes.

The lasting impact of Judge Lagergren’s opinion is that it looked
129
beyond national laws, enunciating “a general principle of law” that
corrupt contracts are void or unenforceable as contrary to
130
international public policy. The notion that bribery is contrary to
international public policy has since developed into an important part
131
of arbitral jurisprudence in the context of international investment.
In recent years, ICSID tribunals have built upon the framework
132
established by Judge Lagergren. Confronting similar questions,

125. The claimant was to receive a commission of 10 percent of all sales. Id. at 285. Of that
commission, “2 per cent [was] for [the claimant] and 8 per cent [was] for ‘Peron and his boys.’”
Id. at 290.
126. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. at 52, ¶ 23.
127. See id. at 51, ¶ 16 (“[I]t cannot be contested that there exists a general principle of law
recognised by civilised nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores or
international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they cannot be
sanctioned by courts or arbitrators.”).
128. Id. at 52, ¶¶ 20, 23.
129. Id. at 51, ¶ 16.
130. Id. at 52, ¶ 23; Wetter, supra note 117, at 278.
131. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7,
Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007) (“[T]his Tribunal is convinced that bribery is
contrary to the international public policy of most, if not all, States or, to use another formula,
to transnational public policy . . . .”).
132. See Yackee, supra note 20, at 727–34 (discussing the origins of the corruption defense
and its current status).
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several tribunals have affirmed his premise that corrupt contracts are
133
void as contrary to international public policy.
Four questions are relevant to understanding the features of the
developing defense. First, what is the nature of the wrongful conduct?
Second, what law is applied by the tribunal? Third, what evidentiary
burden is borne by the parties? And fourth, what is the appropriate
134
remedy? These inquiries are relevant not only to the calculus of
host states seeking to assert the defense. Because some conduct that
may give rise to a successful corruption defense may also give rise to
an FCPA investigation, they are also relevant to crafting just
solutions to the problems created by FCPA-ICSID overlap.
A. Nature of the Wrongful Conduct
The first inquiry regards the nature of the wrongful conduct.
Several distinctions may be made between different types of corrupt
conduct. First, corruption may be either unilateral or mutual. Second,
corruption may be “hard” or “soft.” Third, corruption may be found
either in the object of a contract or in its procurement.
1. Unilateral or Multilateral. Unilateral corruption involves
135
misconduct on the part of only one party. More often than not, this
136
has meant fraud on the part of the investor. Multiple tribunals have
allowed the respondent–host state to assert the corruption defense in
137
response to unilateral corruption. In contrast, mutual corruption
occurs when both parties are complicit in the misconduct. Bribery is a

133. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award,
¶ 252 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf; World
Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157.
134. This formulation of the defense’s contours is based on this author’s synthesis of the
existing case law and scholarship.
135. KULICK, supra note 42, at 328.
136. See, e.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 5 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/
documents/FraportAward.pdf; Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 3;
see also KULICK, supra note 42, at 328 (observing that two of three cases involving unilateral
corruption scrutinized conduct by the investor).
137. See, e.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Award, ¶ 345; Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 154.
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prime example because it entails one party making an illicit payment
138
(“active” bribery) and the other accepting it (“passive” bribery).
Whereas unilateral corruption has given rise to a successful
corruption defense on more than one occasion, only once has mutual
corruption been invoked as grounds for a successful corruption
139
140
defense. In World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, the
respondent–host state succeeded in asserting the corruption defense
after the claimant made a cash payment of $2 million to the Kenyan
141
president’s reelection fund. Whether a state can assert the defense
for mutual corruption may depend on whether the conduct of the
state official can be attributed to the state itself. Notably, the World
Duty Free tribunal did not impute the president’s actions to the
142
state; however, it is unclear whether future tribunals will invoke
misconduct by government officials as grounds for rejecting the
defense. If a tribunal did attribute an official’s conduct to the state, it
could conceivably invoke either the common-law rule of estoppel or
the doctrine of contributory fault to prevent the state from asserting
143
the defense.
Some commentators have called for tribunals to apply a rule of
comparative fault, under which a state could invoke the corruption
144
defense, but only to the extent that it is free of guilt. The state
would still be responsible for compensating the investor for a
percentage of its claim corresponding to the percentage of fault
145
attributable to the state. For example, a state in which high-level
138. See KULICK, supra note 42, at 328 (discussing unilateral and multilateral conduct as
they relate to each party’s role in the corruption).
139. World Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157. As this Note was going to
print, an ICSID tribunal in the matter of Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/3, Award (Oct. 4, 2013), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw3012.pdf, rendered an award barring an Israeli company’s claims as a result of
bribery. Id. ¶ 389. The tribunal found that the claimant made corrupt payments to an Uzbek
official and to the brother of Uzbekistan’s prime minister. Id. ¶¶ 325, 351. The tribunal
ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims because the claimant’s
investment was not made in accordance with Uzbek law as required by Article 1(1) of the
Israel-Uzbekistan BIT. Id. ¶¶ 372–74, 389.
140. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4,
2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
141. Id. ¶¶ 66, 157.
142. Id. ¶ 185.
143. KULICK, supra note 42, at 322–25.
144. Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 1029–30.
145. Id.
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officials regularly extort bribes might be responsible for 75 percent of
the investor’s claim, whereas an investor who seeks out and bribes a
low-level official might only be able to recover 25 percent of its claim.
Nevertheless, considering the paucity of case law and the fact that
World Duty Free is not binding on future tribunals, it is unclear what
effect misconduct by government officials will have on a state’s ability
to assert the defense.
2. Hard or Soft. Second, corruption may be either “hard” or
“soft.” Hard corruption is the offer or promise of an undue advantage
146
to a public official to gain an improper advantage. It may be done
147
directly or through an intermediary. It entails “an intentional act
pursued with the purpose of influencing a public official in the
performance of his or her official duties, which in turn is directed at
148
gaining an undue business advantage.”
The “soft” form of
corruption, or “influence peddling,” is essentially an attenuated form
of hard corruption. It entails the offer or promise of an undue
advantage to a person who claims to be able to exert an undue
149
influence on a public official. Influence peddling by definition
involves an intermediary, but in contrast to hard corruption, the
intermediary need not actually pay a bribe. Moreover, a corporation
engaging in influence peddling need not intend to influence specific
conduct on the part of the public official. The OECD Convention
does not require states to criminalize influence peddling, and the
FCPA does not explicitly do so, given that it requires a payment to be
given in exchange for something—in other words, there must be a
150
“quid pro quo.” Whereas a number of ICSID tribunals have upheld

146. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 73, art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M at 4; KULICK, supra note 42, at 309.
147. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, supra note 73, art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M at 4; KULICK, supra note 42, at 309. ICC Case
No. 1110 involved such an intermediary agreement, with a portion of the intermediary’s
commission to be paid to government officials. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47,
48 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.).
148. KULICK, supra note 42, at 309.
149. Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler & Dorothee Gottwald, Corruption in Foreign Investment—
Contracts and Dispute Settlement Between Investors, States, and Agents, 9 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 5, 7 (2008).
150. See McSorley, supra note 89, at 762–63 (“There must be some quid pro quo element:
the illegal payment must be understood to be given in exchange for unlawful government
action, although completion of the desired action is not required.”).
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151

the corruption defense in cases of hard corruption, no tribunal has
allowed a state to invoke the defense for “mere” influence peddling,
152
and history suggests that future tribunals will also hesitate do so.
3. Object or Procurement. Third, corruption may be found in a
153
contract’s object or in its procurement. Both give rise to a successful
corruption defense. An intermediary agreement for the bribery of a
public official is the prototypical example of a contract with a corrupt
object. Because the consideration (bribery) offered by one party is an
154
illegal act, the contract is legally unenforceable. Such a contract is
155
equivalent to a contract for murder —in the event of breach, a
tribunal will not force either party to make good on its obligation to
commit bribery. Most ICSID jurisprudence, however, deals with
corruption in the procurement of a contract. When a corporation
commits fraud or bribery to win a public concession, for example,
tribunals have generally permitted states to invoke the corruption
156
defense, even if the contract itself is free from defects.
The proposal set forth in Part III of this Note focuses on conduct
that both violates the FCPA and may give rise to a corruption defense
by host states—in particular, bribery that occurs in the procurement
151. E.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 401–06 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/
documents/FraportAward.pdf; Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 250–52 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/
Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 321 (Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/
PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf; World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
152. See Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award,
¶¶ 111–12, 132 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002) (refusing to allow Egypt to invoke
corruption as a defense after the claimant made a number of suspicious payments to an
intermediary without evidence that the intermediary used that money to bribe officials of the
host state).
153. When corruption is found in the object of a contract, “the performance that the ‘buyer’
seeks from the ‘seller’ is itself an illegal, immoral, or otherwise disapproved act.” Yackee, supra
note 20, at 729. When corruption is found in the procurement of a contract, “the core
contractual object [may be] facially unobjectionable, yet the state alleges that this relationship
was attained through the investor’s involvement in a secondary, corrupt scheme.” Id.
154. E.g., Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47, 52, ¶ 23 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.).
155. Yackee, supra note 20, at 729.
156. E.g., Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Award, ¶¶ 401–06; Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 250–52;
Plama Consortium Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 321; World Duty Free, ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157.
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of investment contracts. Although an understanding of the corruption
defense would not be complete without examining how tribunals have
treated unilateral corruption, fraud alone does not constitute a
violation of the FCPA. Moreover, the FCPA does not forbid
influence peddling because it does not entail the passing of bribes to
public officials. Finally, although the FCPA does not distinguish
between corruptly procured contracts and those with a corrupt object,
the corruption defense is rarely asserted in response to contracts with
a corrupt object. Therefore, corruptly procured contracts are most
relevant to this Note’s analysis.
B. Law Applied by the Tribunal
When states have succeeded in asserting the corruption defense,
the rationale of tribunals has varied. Tribunals have relied on three
principal legal justifications for recognizing the corruption defense:
the concept of international (or transnational) public policy, the
requirement that an investment be made in “accordance with laws,”
and the obligation of the parties to act in good faith.
1. International Public Policy. First, it is relatively well-settled in
ICSID jurisprudence that corruption is contrary to international
public policy. Tribunals have built upon the reasoning of Judge
Lagergren in ICC Case No. 1110, invoking both bribery and fraud as
grounds for voiding the underlying contract as contrary to
157
international public policy. The international public policy of a state
consists of three elements: “fundamental principles, pertaining to
justice or morality, that the state wishes to protect even when it is not
directly concerned”; lois de police, the “rules designed to serve the
essential political, social, or economic interests of the State”; and
international obligations owed by a state toward other states or
158
international organizations. International public policy is not a
supranational principle, but merely signifies “domestic public policy
159
applied to foreign awards.” As such, its content and application may
160
vary from state to state.
157. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 252; World Duty Free,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157.
158. Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 ARB. INT’L 249, 255 (2003).
159. World Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 138.
160. Id.
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The tribunal in Inceysa Vallisoletana v. Republic of El Salvador
invoked international public policy as a subsidiary justification for
allowing the respondent–host state to assert the corruption defense to
162
escape liability for breach of an investment contract. There, the
claimant submitted falsified information as part of its bid for a public
163
concession in violation of Salvadoran law. The tribunal ultimately
held that granting the claimant treaty protection for a contract
164
procured by fraud would violate international public policy.
According to the tribunal, international public policy consists of the
“fundamental principles that constitute the very essence of the
165
166
State.” One such principle is the notion of respect for the law. To
recognize the existence of rights arising from illegal acts would violate
the principle of respect for the law, and therefore the tribunal would
violate international public policy if it allowed the claim to go
forward.
Though it dealt with bribery as opposed to fraud, the World Duty
Free tribunal went a step farther than the Inceysa tribunal. It held
bribery to be “contrary to the international public policy of most, if
167
not all, States” and therefore contrary to transnational public policy.
Transnational public policy is more restricted in scope than
168
It
international public policy, but universal in application.
“compris[es] fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal
justice, jus cogens [norms of] . . . international law, and the general

161. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award
(Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf.
162. Id. ¶ 245.
163. Id. ¶ 251.
164. Id. ¶ 252.
165. Id. ¶ 245.
166. The tribunal noted that the inclusion of provisions in the BIT stating that investments
must be made “in accordance with law” is a “clear manifestation” of international public policy.
Id. ¶ 246. Such provisions are discussed in Part II.B.2.
167. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
168. Int’l Law Ass’n, Comm. on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, London Conference, 2000,
Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 6–7
(2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/E723662E-053C-415A-A4C7822
577AE6B4F. Transnational public policy reflects “an international consensus as to universal
standards and accepted norms of conduct that must always apply . . . .” Id. at 2–3. It
“compris[es] fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal justice, jus cogens in
public international law, and the general principles of morality accepted by what are referred to
as ‘civilised nations.’” Id. at 6–7.
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principles of morality accepted by . . . ‘civilized nations.’” In World
Duty Free, a $2 million cash bribe paid to the Kenyan president to
obtain an investment contract rendered the contract voidable at
170
respondent Kenya’s option. The tribunal verified the existence of an
objective norm of transnational public policy against bribery by
making reference to international conventions, comparative law, and
171
arbitral awards. It then reasoned that there was nothing inherently
wrong with the contract itself, but that the fact that it was procured by
bribery allowed the state “the opportunity to relieve [it]self from its
172
burdens.” Kenya’s defense therefore allowed it to treat the contract
as if it were rescinded. In administering the defense, the tribunal
called upon the maxim restitutio in integrum, which dictated that the
173
bribe could not be returned to the claimant.
2. Accordance with Laws. A second justification invoked by
ICSID tribunals for granting the corruption defense rests upon treaty
provisions stating that investments must be made in accordance with
laws. ICSID jurisdiction is premised upon the existence of a dispute
174
arising directly out of an investment. Additionally, the parties to a
175
dispute must consent to jurisdiction. Nearly all BITs, which provide
for general consent by both states to arbitrate disputes, contain a
176
definition of the term “investment.” This definition typically
includes a requirement that an investment be made in accordance
with the laws of one or both contracting states. For example, the
provision at issue in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services
177
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines
defines a covered
169. Id.
170. World Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶¶ 130, 164, 188.
171. Id. ¶¶ 141–57.
172. Id. ¶ 164.
173. Id. ¶ 164, 186.
174. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Dispute Settlement: International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Module 2.5: Requirements Ratione Materiae, at 5,
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.4 (2003).
175. Id. at 1.
176. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
177. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 281 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf.
Claimant Fraport obtained annulment of the award in 2010 and subsequently filed a new claim
before ICSID. Jarrod Hepburn, Fraport Files New Claim at ICSID over Expropriation of
Airport Terminal Project; Annulment Committee Ruling Paved Way for New Hearing by Finding
Breach of Investor’s Right To Be Heard, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Mar. 31, 2011),
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investment as “any kind of asset accepted in accordance with the
178
respective laws and regulations of either [c]ontracting [s]tate.” An
investment not made in accordance with the applicable laws does not
qualify as an “investment” for purposes of the BIT, and it therefore
does not qualify for the protections granted by the treaty, including
the host state’s advance consent to arbitration. Thus, tribunals have
invoked the failure of prospective investments to comply with BIT “in
accordance” provisions as grounds for declining jurisdiction, thereby
precluding claimants’ chances to recover.
At least three uncertainties arise in interpreting and applying “in
accordance” provisions. First, with which laws and regulations must
an investor comply, and what constitutes “in accordance”? Must a
prospective investor conduct a full legal-compliance audit for every
investment, ensuring that it “compl[ies] with each and every provision
179
of domestic law”? This could become an “Achilles Heel of
investment arbitration” if a trivial violation of any law could give rise
180
to a successful defense. The Inceysa tribunal held that the claimant’s
investment must comply with “generally recognized rules and
181
principles of International Law” and “universal standards and rules
182
of conduct,” as had been specified in the underlying investment
contract. The tribunal concluded that these principles incorporated
183
the notion of good faith. The Inceysa and Fraport tribunals both
held that unilateral fraud by investors caused the investments in
184
question to violate “in accordance” provisions, though the Fraport
dissent suggested that a minor violation of an anticorruption law, such
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110331_7. The award was annulled pursuant to Article
52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention for the tribunal’s serious departure from a fundamental rule
of procedure by denying Fraport the right to be heard. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs.
Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application
for Annulment, ¶¶ 218–47 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-AnnulmentDecision.pdf. Nevertheless, the award’s annulment does not alter the significance of the
tribunal’s reasoning with regard to the corruption defense.
178. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award,
¶ 281 (emphasis omitted).
179. Id. ¶ 304.
180. Id. § 37 (Cremades, Arb., dissenting).
181. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award,
¶ 224 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf.
182. Id. ¶ 227.
183. Id. ¶ 230.
184. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 239; Fraport AG
Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 401.
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as a grease payment intended to speed up a routine transaction, might
185
not run afoul of those same provisions. Likewise, the Inceysa
tribunal suggested that to bar a claim, an investment must be “made
in significant contravention” of the applicable law, “such as through
186
gross misrepresentation or fraud in a government tender process.”
A second uncertainty lies in determining whether “in
accordance” provisions impose a continuous duty upon the investor
to monitor the compliance of an investment, or whether such
provisions extend only to the initiation of the investment. The Fraport
tribunal suggested that “in accordance” provisions apply only to the
initiation of an investment, and that subsequent violations of the host
state’s law “might be a defense to claimed substantive violations of
the BIT, but could not deprive a tribunal acting under the authority
187
of the BIT of its jurisdiction.”
A final uncertainty concerns the existence of mitigating factors
that might excuse violations of the applicable law. The Fraport
tribunal hypothesized that an investor who breaks the law might still
188
be allowed to bring a claim if one of several factors is present. Such
factors include a good-faith mistake by the investor regarding an
unclear host-state law, reliance on incorrect legal advice, or a
violation “not central to the profitability of the investment, such that
the investor might have made the investment in ways that accorded
189
with local law without any loss of projected profitability.”
Moreover, an investor could potentially assert an affirmative defense
of estoppel to block the corruption defense if the host state endorsed
the investment while “knowingly overlook[ing]” conduct not in
190
accordance with its laws. No tribunal has yet invoked estoppel or
any of the above mitigating factors in response to the corruption
defense, so for now they remain mere hypotheticals.
185. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award,
§ 37 (Cremades, Arb., dissenting).
186. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 202 (emphasis added).
187. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award,
¶ 345.
188. See id. ¶ 396 (listing several arguments in favor of a liberal policy of granting
jurisdiction to investors’ claims).
189. Id.
190. Id. ¶ 346. The tribunal in World Duty Free was unwilling to impute knowledge or
responsibility to the respondent state based on the actions of its president. The tribunal
considered and rejected the claimant’s estoppel claim. Id. ¶ 183. If future tribunals follow this
trend, estoppel may prove near impossible to assert. Yackee, supra note 20, at 741–42.
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3. Good Faith. Third, ICSID tribunals have imputed a duty of
good faith to the parties and granted the corruption defense as a
result of the claimant’s violation of that duty. Two ICSID tribunals
have held fraud by an investor to constitute a violation of the duty of
good faith. These cases indicate that the duty includes an obligation
to provide information to the host state, at least in the initiation of an
investment. Furthermore, applicable domestic and international law
may incorporate the duty, meaning that a breach of good faith can
also constitute a violation of “in accordance” provisions.
The Inceysa tribunal held that the investor’s submission of false
information in connection with a public concession constituted a
191
breach of good faith. It defined good faith as the “absence of deceit
and artifice during the negotiation and execution of instruments that
gave rise to the investment, as well as loyalty, truth and intent to
maintain the equilibrium between the reciprocal performance of the
192
parties.” The investor’s failure to act in such a fashion undermined
193
the consent of the host state to ICSID jurisdiction. Moreover, the
breach of good faith meant its investment was not made in
accordance with the host state’s laws, which apparently incorporated
194
the duty.
195
Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria arose not under a BIT but
196
under the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty, which does not
contain an “in accordance” provision. The tribunal concluded that
misrepresentation by the investor of its true ownership constituted
“deliberate concealment amounting to fraud, calculated to induce the
Bulgarian authorities to authorize the transfer of shares to an entity
that did not have the financial and managerial capacities required to
197
resume operation of the Refinery.” The tribunal imputed an
198
obligation of good faith to Plama under both domestic and

191. Inceysa Vallisoletana, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 239.
192. Id. ¶ 231 (emphasis added).
193. Id. ¶¶ 237–38.
194. Id. ¶¶ 238–39.
195. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf.
196. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95; see Plama Consortium Ltd.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 1.
197. Plama Consortium Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 135.
198. Id. ¶¶ 136, 144. As translated by Professor Metody Markov, who served as an expert in
the Plama arbitration, Article 12 of Bulgaria’s Obligations and Contracts Acts (OCA) states
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199

international law. It held the principle of good faith to encompass
an “obligation for the investor to provide the host State with relevant
and material information concerning the investor and the
investment,” especially “when the information is necessary for
200
obtaining the State’s approval of the investment.”
In sum, three principal legal justifications have supported the
corruption defense: the concept of international (or transnational)
public policy, the requirement that an investment be made in
“accordance with laws,” and the obligation of the parties to act in
good faith. The Inceysa tribunal seems to have incorporated notions
of good faith and international public policy into the requirement that
an investment be made in accordance with laws, but other case law
suggests that these are indeed separate justifications that tribunals
may invoke in the absence of an “in accordance” provision.
C. Evidentiary Burden
Although there is some uncertainty surrounding the details of
the three rationales that have emerged in support of the corruption
defense, ICSID jurisprudence is even murkier with regard to the
evidentiary burden that each party should bear. At least one tribunal
201
has applied a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, but others
202
have failed to define a precise standard. It is unclear what standard,
if any, will emerge as the rule among future tribunals. Tribunals have
been reluctant to inquire deeply into allegations of corruption when
further evidence may be available. When there have been ongoing
domestic investigations into improper conduct, tribunals have not
203
waited for the outcome of these investigations. For example, the
Fraport tribunal refused a request by the respondent–host state for a
stay of proceedings pending the outcome of investigations into the

that “parties must negotiate and enter contracts in good faith.” Id. ¶ 136. Articles 27 and 29 of
the OCA provide that contracts induced by fraud are subject to invalidation. Id.
199. Id. ¶ 144.
200. Id.
201. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 326 (June 1,
2009), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf.
202. See infra Part II.C.2.
203. E.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 56
(July 14, 2006), 14 ICSID Rep. 374 (2009); Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v.
Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 5, 27 (Aug. 16, 2007),
http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf.
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204

claimant’s allegedly corrupt conduct. Notably, most of the limited
ICSID jurisprudence on the standard of proof has arisen from cases
205
of fraud, as opposed to bribery.
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence. The tribunal in Siag v.
206
Egypt applied “the American standard of ‘“clear and convincing
evidence,’” which lies “somewhere between the traditional civil
standard of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ (otherwise known as the
‘balance of probabilities’), and the criminal standard of ‘beyond
207
reasonable doubt.’” The tribunal reasoned this was appropriate
both because the claimant had adduced a great deal of prima facie
evidence that he had not committed fraud and because serious
208
allegations, such as fraud, demand a high standard of proof.
2. Undefined Standard. Other tribunals have held that the
evidence adduced by the respondent–host state has not been
sufficient to support the corruption defense, but they have failed to
209
define the precise burden that should be applied. They do agree,

204. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award,
¶ 47 (quoting Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Procedural Order No. 21, ¶ 17 (Jan. 6, 2006)).
205. In World Duty Free (the only case to grant the corruption defense for bribery), the
claimant freely admitted to paying a bribe, so the tribunal had no chance to consider the
appropriate standard of proof. See World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 130 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
206. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award (June 1, 2009),
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786_0.pdf.
207. Id. ¶ 325.
208. Id. ¶¶ 324–26.
209. Florian Haugeneder & Christoph Liebscher, Corruption and Investment Arbitration:
Substantive Standards and Proof, in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 2009, at 539, 549–50
(Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2009). In Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/4, Award (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002), the claimant made a number of
suspiciously timed payments, totaling £52,000, to its agent in the host state. Id ¶ 71. Ultimately,
the mere presence of suspicious payments to an intermediary was not enough to establish fraud,
but the tribunal was unwilling to draw a precise line: “‘[T]he delicate problem[] remains for an
arbitral tribunal ‘to determine precisely where the line should be drawn between legal and
illegal contracts, between illegal bribery and legal commissions.’” Id. ¶ 111 (quoting Pierre
Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 277
(Pieter Standers, ed., 1987)). Future tribunals may, however, be satisfied by evidence that the
intermediary used that money to bribe officials of the host state. The tribunal in TSA Spectrum
de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award (Dec. 19, 2008), 48
I.L.M. 496 (2009), held that the burden of proof is high for allegations of bribery, and that
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however, that the burden is high: “An accusation of bribery requires
210
the most rigorous level of proof.” One dissenting arbitrator argued
for a lower standard of proof allowing tribunals discretion to make
inferences based on “concordant circumstantial evidence,” but no
211
tribunal has applied this standard.
D. Remedies
A final question about the corruption defense concerns the
remedies it affords. When a state succeeds in asserting the corruption
defense, what form does the remedy granted by the tribunal take?
Here, as elsewhere, the reasoning of tribunals has varied, and the
precise remedy depends upon both the source of ICSID jurisdiction
and the law applied by the tribunal. First, when an investor’s violation
of a treaty-based “in accordance” provision gives rise to the defense,
212
the remedy has been jurisdictional in nature. Because the investor’s
activity does not qualify as an “investment” under the BIT (or other
treaty), it cannot enjoy the protections granted by that document. The
state’s general consent to ICSID arbitration is one such protection
that the investor loses as a result of its corrupt conduct. Without the
consent of both parties, ICSID cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
213
dispute.
Second, even when an investment treaty does not contain an
express “in accordance” provision, a tribunal may impute such a
requirement to the treaty’s substantive protections. Corrupt conduct
may thus cause an investor to lose the substantive protections of the
“uncorroborated statements” and ongoing domestic criminal investigations do not satisfy that
burden. Id. ¶¶ 172–75.
210. TSA Spectrum, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award, ¶ 172; see also Douglas Thomson,
How To Deal with Corruption Allegations, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32055/how-deal-corruption-allegations
(“[A]llegations of corruption must be proved to a very high probability . . . .”).
211. Siag, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Francisco
Orrego Vicuña at 4 (quoting ABDULHAY SAYED, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 93–94 (2004)).
212. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/03/25,
Award,
¶
404
(Aug.
16,
2007),
http://italaw.com/
documents/FraportAward.pdf (holding that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute);
Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 335–
36 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf (same).
213. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 22, art. 25(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 575 U.N.T.S. at 175; see supra note 38
and accompanying text.
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treaty. The tribunal retains jurisdiction, but the investor’s claim loses
214
on the merits because it has no rights to invoke under the treaty.
Finally, a tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over the dispute and
hold that the investor’s corrupt conduct has rendered the contract
voidable at the respondent–host state’s option. This was the
conclusion reached by the tribunal in World Duty Free, in which
ICSID’s jurisdiction was premised not upon a treaty but upon consent
215
given in the investment contract. Importantly, the contract was not
void ab initio; the respondent–host state was required to act to set it
216
aside. The remedy was restitutio in integrum, which entailed
returning the parties to their original positions, but did not include
217
returning the bribe to the bribe payer.
This Part has traced the contours of the corruption defense as it
has been applied by ICSID tribunals. It has focused on four principal
inquiries. First, what is the nature of the wrongful conduct? Second,
what law is applied by the tribunal? Third, what evidentiary burden is
borne by the parties? And fourth, what is the appropriate remedy?
These inquiries reveal that though the defense is in flux, it has certain
characteristic elements that appear to be relatively static.
III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR FCPA-ICSID INTERACTION
This Part seeks to reconcile the divergent goals of the
international investment arbitration regime and the anticorruption
regime. The following framework aims to prevent corruption while
encouraging investment. It seeks to achieve this goal by promoting
justice and transparency in situations in which the regimes intersect.
This Part proposes that, in keeping with the current supply-side
approach of the anticorruption regime, investors should be punished
for their corrupt behavior. At the same time, FCPA enforcement
authorities and ICSID tribunals should endeavor to ensure that
neither the investor nor the host state reaps the rewards of its own
corrupt behavior.

214. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award,
¶¶ 97–98 (Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf.
215. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 6
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
216. Id. ¶¶ 164, 183.
217. Id. ¶¶ 164, 186.
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A robust corruption defense in ICSID arbitration proceedings is
an essential part of global efforts to stem the tide of corruption,
especially in developing, capital-importing states. The common-law
doctrine of unclean hands dictates that a claimant should not be
218
permitted to enforce contracts procured by corrupt means, and
ICSID tribunals have correctly followed similar logic in denying
219
recovery to corrupt investors. Yet an FCPA investigation into an
investor’s conduct only compounds the uncertainty created by the
complexity of the defense and the lack of consistency among tribunals
in applying it. At the root of the problem is a lack of coordination
between the two overlapping regimes. Because no framework exists
to govern communication between ICSID tribunals and domestic
anticorruption authorities, two distinct problems may emerge when
the corruption defense interacts with an FCPA investigation.
First, ICSID arbitration may completely overlook covert
corruption. The ICSID dispute-settlement system (in which investors
are the claimants, states are the respondents, and monetary damages
are the principal remedy) is not designed to ferret out covert
corruption in the foreign-investment context, which is likely to be far
220
more common than the open bribery seen in World Duty Free. The
authorities tasked with investigating and enforcing domestic
anticorruption statutes, such as the FCPA, are likely to be much more
adept at rooting out corruption. Indeed, by uncovering evidence of
covert corruption unknown to a prior ICSID tribunal, an FCPA

218. See Yackee, supra note 20, at 729 n.35 (“[U]nclean hands . . . ‘clos[es] the doors of a
court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which
he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.’” (quoting
Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2000)).
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See Andreas Kulick & Carsten Wendler, A Corrupt Way To Handle Corruption?:
Thoughts on the Recent ICSID Case Law on Corruption, 37 LEGAL ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION 61, 83 (2010) (“Needless to say, tribunals lack sufficient instruments and
equipment to pursue criminal investigations . . . .”); cf. Gary Born, Bribery and an Arbitrator’s
Task, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2011/10/11/bribery-and-an-arbitrator’s-task (“Traditionally, arbitration was not perceived
as an appropriate venue for adjudicating claims of bribery or corruption. The resistance to
recognizing the arbitrability of bribery claims was based on a limited view of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction, and included concerns about the tribunal’s restricted power to compel the
production of evidence—particularly as compared with that of regulatory authorities that have
traditionally investigated and prosecuted crimes of bribery—and the tribunal’s lack of authority
to impose criminal penalties.”). But see Kulick & Wendler, supra, at 83. (“[H]owever, [tribunals]
have enough leeway and leverage to find a fair and just result to the dispute.”).
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investigation may reveal that the result reached by the tribunal was
221
incorrect. Given the lack of an appeals process in ICSID arbitration,
it is unclear what recourse a respondent–host state might have in such
circumstances.
Second, the outcome of an FCPA investigation (a conviction,
civil judgment, or prosecution agreement) may give host states an
222
incentive to expropriate an investor’s assets. Depending on how
much information is made public, a state could use the evidence of
corruption uncovered by the investigation to invoke the corruption
defense and thereby escape liability for expropriation. Awareness of
this protection could embolden states to expropriate assets when they
otherwise might not do so. This incentive is fueled in part by the
award in World Duty Free, which did not impute to Kenya the
223
culpable actions of the country’s own president. By recognizing the
corruption defense for states whose officials solicit bribes, future
ICSID tribunals would essentially permit corrupt host states to reap
the rewards of their own misconduct.
As made clear by Siemens and Fraport, the temporal relationship
between FCPA and ICSID proceedings may affect what problems
224
arise due to the regimes’ overlap. This Part divides this relationship
into three distinct situations. First, ICSID arbitration may precede an
FCPA investigation. In this case the danger of an incorrect ICSID
award, such as in Siemens, is particularly acute. Second, an FCPA
investigation may precede conduct giving rise to an ICSID claim. This
scenario creates an incentive for host states to expropriate. Third, an
FCPA investigation and ICSID proceedings may take place
simultaneously, potentially giving rise to both dangers.

221. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
222. See Torres-Fowler, supra note 1, at 998–1000 (noting that antibribery investigations and
enforcement actions facilitate the use of the corruption defense by host states in arbitration
actions against investors, which consequently allows the host state to emerge from arbitration in
a net-positive position).
223. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 185
(Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
224. Cf. Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 89–90 (noting that disclosure of an FCPA violation may
occur either before or after breach of contract by a “foreign contracting party” and identifying
problems that may arise in each scenario).
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A. ICSID First: Ensure Just Results Through Waiver and
Disgorgement or by “Offsetting” ICSID Awards
As Siemens demonstrated, when an arbitral award is issued
before the commencement of an FCPA investigation, ICSID
tribunals can come to incorrect conclusions because of a failure to
225
uncover evidence of covert corruption. To protect against such
incorrect results, FCPA enforcement authorities should require
corporations to waive their ICSID claims as a condition of
226
prosecution agreements. If an award has already been rendered and
paid, the authorities should require the corporation to disgorge the
227
award. Alternatively, the DOJ and SEC might consider offsetting
FCPA penalties by the amount of a successful ICSID claim, but such
228
a strategy suffers from several flaws.
1. Waiver/Disgorgement. Following its FCPA settlement in 2008,
Siemens waived its right to the $217 million award that it had won
229
against Argentina. It is unclear, however, precisely why it did so. If
Siemens decided independently to waive the award, that choice
demonstrates just how much companies value their public image and
how far they are willing to go to avoid reputational harm. If the
waiver came as a condition of its FCPA settlement, then that may
point to the DOJ’s willingness to make this a normal condition of plea
and prosecution agreements.
Regardless of whether Siemens waived the award of its own
volition or whether it was forced to do so pursuant to its FCPA
settlement, its forfeiture of the award appears to be a normatively
desirable result. If the tribunal had been aware of all the facts, it
almost certainly would have recognized a corruption defense in favor
230
of Argentina. Alternatively, had the FCPA investigation never
occurred, Siemens would have succeeded in reaping the benefits of its
own corrupt conduct by exploiting the dispute-resolution provisions
of a treaty the protections of which it was not entitled to enjoy.
225. See supra Part III.
226. See infra Part III.A.1.
227. See infra Part III.A.1.
228. See infra Part III.A.2.
229. Peterson, supra note 12.
230. In the one instance in which a claimant freely admitted to bribery, the tribunal
recognized the defense. See supra note 205. For an explanation of the various rationales for
recognizing the defense, see supra Part II.B.
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Accordingly, to ensure correct outcomes in the future, the DOJ and
SEC should require investors to waive their rights to ICSID awards
(or to disgorge awards already paid) as a condition of prosecution
agreements. In conformity with the maxim restitutio in integrum, the
claimant’s waiver of an award restores the parties to the positions
they would have enjoyed had the respondent–host state succeeded in
231
asserting the corruption defense. The DOJ and SEC should not
object to implementing such a requirement, as it would aid the
FCPA’s ultimate goal of fighting corruption.
When a respondent–host state has already paid an award, the
funds might be used in a number of ways. The disgorged award could
be forfeited to the investigating country’s government, used to
implement changes to reporting and bookkeeping practices within the
claimant corporation, or placed into an anticorruption fund to
support anticorruption efforts in the host state. The best solution
might incorporate several of these elements, based on the prosecuting
authorities’ best judgment in the individual situation. Alternatively,
the investor could return the funds to the host state, but doing so
would achieve the same result as if the tribunal had recognized the
host state’s corruption defense. This would essentially permit the
state to reap the benefits of its corrupt conduct. By using its discretion
to tailor the remedy to the particular situation, the DOJ can help
232
achieve the most just result in the given circumstances.
2. Offsetting. One commentator has proposed that FCPA
233
penalties be offset by the amount an investor loses in arbitration.
This proposal entails reducing the violator’s FCPA penalty by the
amount of its failed ICSID claim in the event that the host state
invokes the corruption defense. The proposal is attractive because it
seeks to temper the price paid by corrupt investors so that the
combined effect of the FCPA and the corruption defense do not act
as a deterrent to foreign direct investment. It could, however,
potentially undermine the FCPA’s supply-side approach to

231. World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award,
¶¶ 164, 186 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
232. Increasing the DOJ’s discretion to enforce the FCPA may not always be viewed
favorably, but a discussion of the normative value of increased DOJ discretion is beyond the
scope of this Note. The DOJ’s discretion could always be corralled by legislative enactment or
by an official memorandum setting new guidelines for FCPA enforcement.
233. E.g. Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 111.
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corruption. Both parties to mutual corruption are culpable, and
capitulating to investors could do more harm than good by weakening
the appearance of certainty attached to FCPA sanctions.
The argument in favor of offsetting rests on an assumption that
criminal penalties and settlements for FCPA violations are
fundamentally the same as the loss of investment assets due to
expropriation. This is not the case. A tribunal’s recognition of the
corruption defense is not a monetary penalty against the investor,
albeit the defense may have significant monetary consequences.
Rather, the investor forfeits the protection it once enjoyed under an
investment treaty. Even then, the investor would not be completely
without recourse, as it would still have access to the domestic courts
of the host country. This return to the pre-BIT status quo may not be
an appealing option (especially in a country where corruption is
prevalent), but it reinforces the FCPA’s supply-side approach by
acting as a further deterrent to engaging in corrupt activity.
Offsetting penalties might create an incentive for companies to
actively overstate their claims (even more so than they might
already). What if the amount of the investor’s claim is greater than
the FCPA penalty that would be assessed? If the entire claim were
offset, a company’s only punishment would be the expropriation of
their investment, with no FCPA fine at all. When the investor pleads
guilty to violations, this arrangement would at least undermine the
punitive value of FCPA sanctions. The same holds true when the
investor signs a prosecution agreement. Though these mechanisms
allow investors to avoid a criminal conviction, they do still hold some
punitive value.
B. FCPA First: Counteract the Incentive To Expropriate by
Mandating an Opportunity for Cure or by Concealing
Enforcement Actions
When an FCPA investigation reveals that an investor has
corruptly procured an investment contract, the corruption defense
creates a perverse incentive for the host state to expropriate the
234
investor’s assets by offering the state immunity from claims. Host
states might also attempt to renegotiate the investment contract to

234. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
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insert burdensome new terms, secure in the knowledge that they are
235
protected by the corruption defense.
Because the SEC and DOJ generally bear different burdens of
proof, however, host states may have different incentives depending
on which agency pursues the action. The SEC need only prove
236
corruption by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil suit,
whereas the DOJ must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a
237
criminal prosecution. Although it is unclear what standard of proof
an ICSID tribunal would apply, the standard would likely be high. A
tribunal may or may not follow the Siag tribunal’s lead and apply a
238
“clear and convincing evidence” standard. A criminal conviction for
bribery or a DPA containing an admission of guilt might be
convincing or at least highly persuasive to a tribunal, whereas a civil
judgment under a lesser standard of proof will likely carry less weight.
This raises the possibility that a prior criminal conviction will provide
a host state with greater incentive to expropriate, whereas a civil
judgment will render it less confident in its ability to mount a
successful corruption defense. Regardless of the standard, evidence
uncovered in the course of FCPA investigations may tempt
unscrupulous host states to try their luck, knowing that the worst-case
scenario entails reimbursing the investor for the expropriated assets.

235. See Bhojwani, supra note 18, at 106 (“The settlement may enable the foreign
contracting party to breach the contract, renegotiate its terms, threaten to reopen proceedings,
or present the FCPA violation as evidence for an arbitral tribunal considering a breach of
contract claim.”). Because a voidable contract (as opposed to a contract void ab initio) remains
valid unless the state takes action to set it aside, states may have an incentive to renegotiate
contracts following FCPA settlements. A state could use the threat of expropriation to strongarm investors into providing additional consideration or accepting burdensome new terms.
Investors who refuse to accept those terms might face expropriation of their investments with
little chance for recourse. In such a scenario, it might be prudent for the U.S. government to put
diplomatic pressure on the host country to accept reasonable terms. If the ICSID award came
first, the renegotiation might include return of the award in whole or in part, depending on the
DOJ’s assessment of the culpability of the state. This situation illustrates the utility of a BIT
provision requiring a state to accept compensation for actual harm resulting from the
corruption. See infra Part III.B.2.
236. McSorley, supra note 89, at 754 n.30.
237. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 877 (2007)
(“In criminal law . . . [a] corporate defendant has the right to a grand jury, to a jury trial, to be
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and to protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.”).
238. See supra Part II.C.
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1. Opportunity for Cure. One potential solution would be to
mandate an opportunity for the investor to cure its breach of the
investment contract. The United States could easily amend its Model
239
BIT to include a provision stating that, when bribery would
otherwise render a contract voidable or unenforceable, the host state
relinquishes any claim to the corruption defense upon payment of
damages to the host state for all actual harm incurred as a result of
the corruption. These damages could be assessed in conjunction with
240
any criminal fines or disgorgement penalties. Compliance with this
requirement could become a standard provision of prosecution
agreements, and the details of such compliance would most likely
need to be outlined in an official DOJ memo updating the FCPA
enforcement guidelines. Although amending existing BITs to include
cure provisions would likely be more difficult, the United States could
also apply diplomatic pressure on host states to gain their
acquiescence. Alternatively, individual investors could negotiate cure
provisions into their investment contracts.
The main advantage of such provisions is that they would negate
host states’ incentive to expropriate following an FCPA violation,
ensuring both that investors retain access to a neutral forum for
protecting their assets and that unscrupulous host states do not
benefit from their own wrongdoing. However, investors would have
to cooperate with anticorruption authorities to benefit from cure
provisions. Otherwise, they would remain vulnerable to expropriation
by host states. This would act as a strong incentive to ensure full
cooperation with FCPA investigations.
2. Conceal FCPA Enforcement Actions. Another potential
solution, albeit a less desirable one, is to keep FCPA enforcement
actions secret. The DOJ could refuse to share any evidence with an
ICSID tribunal when the expropriation occurs after the FCPA
settlement (as long as the company is still on good behavior). It could

239. As its name suggests, the Model BIT is a model text used as the basis for negotiating
new BITs. See Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). The State Department and
the U.S. Trade Representative, working in conjunction with other agencies, most recently
updated the Model BIT in 2012. Id.
240. In practice, actual injury resulting from bribery might be difficult to assess. In the event
that no actual damages can be calculated, a cure provision could, for example, provide for the
payment of nominal damages or a contribution to an anticorruption fund in the host state.
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then retain the threat of publicizing such evidence as leverage to
ensure the investor’s full cooperation and future FCPA compliance.
Alternatively, it could include a clause in the prosecution agreement
stating that the settlement is neither an admission nor a judicial
determination of guilt.
In keeping with the principle of restitutio in integrum and the
241
doctrine of unclean hands,
prosecution-agreement signatories
should be required to agree not to bring an ICSID claim against the
host state for any expropriation that has already occurred. Because
the investor engaged in corrupt activity, it should not be permitted to
invoke the protections of a BIT for claims arising from that activity.
International public policy, good faith, and any applicable “in
accordance” provisions instruct that the investor must forfeit the
242
treaty’s protections. The DOJ could give teeth to this obligation by
threatening to release evidence to the arbitral tribunal in the event
that the investor does bring a claim. Although such an approach
might prevent host states from utilizing FCPA enforcement actions as
signals to expropriate, it would introduce further opacity into the
application of the FCPA, and for that reason might not be desirable.
C. Simultaneous Proceedings: Ensure Correct Arbitral Awards by
Encouraging Investors To Stay ICSID Claims Pending the Results
of FCPA Investigations
A third scenario encompasses situations in which FCPA
investigations and arbitral proceedings take place simultaneously.
Fraport serves as an example of such a case in which documents from
a corruption investigation could have been extremely useful to an
ICSID tribunal in deciding the outcome of arbitration proceedings,
but were not handed over. In Fraport, the Philippines requested a
stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of corruption
243
investigations.
The Philippines ultimately prevailed because
Fraport’s investment was not made in accordance with Philippine law,
but information uncovered in a corruption investigation could have
241. See World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award,
¶¶ 164, 186 (Oct. 4, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 339 (2007).
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶ 47 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAward.pdf.
The tribunal did not grant the request. Id. (quoting Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs.
Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Procedural Order No. 21, ¶ 17 (Jan. 6, 2006)).
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given it another avenue to victory. This situation underscores one
advantage of the FCPA over ICSID proceedings: although ICSID
tribunals do have the legal power to compel production of
documents, that power is different from the investigatory power
vested in the DOJ, SEC, and FBI under the FCPA.
It should be an uncontroversial assertion that the FBI is capable
of uncovering evidence that may escape an arbitral tribunal’s notice
entirely. So as to benefit from the investigative resources of the
bodies tasked with FCPA enforcement, ICSID tribunals should make
it their policy to ask for—and the DOJ should be prepared to make—
recommendations about whether to stay proceedings pending an
FCPA outcome. At the same time, the DOJ should encourage
claimants to stay their arbitration claims. This would permit domestic
anticorruption authorities—in the United States and elsewhere—to
conduct a full investigation, the results of which could inform the
outcome of the ICSID claim. ICSID proceedings could resume
following the conclusion of the FCPA investigation. In this way, a
tribunal could conceivably enlist any number of domestic
anticorruption authorities as “detectives” to ensure that an award is
rendered based on accurate and complete facts. Those authorities
should gladly lend their assistance because ICSID awards based on
correct information will reward honest investors while punishing
244
corrupt ones.
Notably, the Fraport tribunal’s refusal to grant a stay, as
requested by the Philippines, indicates that future tribunals may be
245
reluctant to grant stays requested by respondent–host states.
However, tribunals should be more willing to grant a stay requested
by the claimant because the claimant could ultimately decide to drop
its claim anyway. In the wake of Siemens, they should be especially
eager to collect as much information as possible so as to assure they
reach correct decisions.
FCPA enforcement authorities may take different steps
depending on the outcome of the investigation. When an FCPA
investigation uncovers no evidence of corruption, the DOJ, for
244. Such fact-finding could potentially be a costly endeavor. Any costs arising from
expediting an investigation or producing evidence to a tribunal could be borne by the parties to
the ICSID dispute.
245. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Award, ¶ 47 (explaining the tribunal’s denial of the stay request and its perception that the
record was sufficient).
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example, could recommend to the tribunal that nothing was found.
Moreover, it could leverage such a recommendation of innocence to
obtain cooperation from investors, conditioning a favorable report on
the investor’s full cooperation. When an investigation does uncover
evidence of corruption, the DOJ may understandably hesitate to
share that evidence with a tribunal. Instead, the DOJ could require
the investor to drop its arbitration claim as part of a prosecution
agreement, thereby achieving a just outcome and rightly depriving the
investor of BIT protection. If Siemens is any guide, investors will
almost certainly comply out of fear of the reputational harm that can
246
accompany a criminal conviction.
CONCLUSION
As the number of FCPA enforcement actions and ICSID
arbitration claims has exploded in recent years, interplay between the
two regimes has become more frequent. However, the lack of
coordination between the two regimes creates problems for the
normative effectiveness of each. This Note has outlined the rough
contours of the emerging corruption defense as applied by ICSID
tribunals, including the evidentiary burden placed upon the host state
for asserting the defense. It has also addressed two significant
problems that have manifested in recent ICSID cases. First, as
Siemens demonstrated, incorrect arbitral decisions can result from a
lack of evidence of corruption in the formation of investment
contracts. Second, the corruption defense creates a perverse incentive
for states to expropriate investors’ assets following FCPA
investigations. This Note has proposed a framework for FCPA-ICSID
interaction designed to solve these problems by strengthening the
corruption defense and promoting justice and transparency.
To ensure that investors do not reap the rewards of their own
corrupt conduct, when an ICSID award in favor of the investor
precedes an FCPA investigation, FCPA enforcement authorities
should require the investor to waive or disgorge the award. Likewise,
to avoid harmful opportunism by host states, when an FCPA
settlement precedes ICSID arbitration, the investor should be
allowed to cure the contract by reimbursing the host state for any

246. See Weiss, supra note 68, at 511–12 (noting the harsh impact of reputational damage
stemming from a criminal conviction).
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actual harm resulting from the corruption. Finally, to ensure that
ICSID awards are based on the best possible evidence, when ICSID
and FCPA proceedings are simultaneous, the domestic enforcement
authorities should encourage the investor to stay its arbitration claim
pending the outcome of the FCPA investigation. The DOJ and SEC
should be prepared to make recommendations to the arbitral tribunal
about whether a stay would be advisable. In the end, the mechanisms
outlined herein will contribute to the eradication of corruption and
the achievement of just results in investment-arbitration claims and
will help to resolve some of the glaring uncertainties posed by the
lack of coordination between ICSID proceedings and FCPA
enforcement actions.

